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1::1;:: CORPORATION. 
a corporation. 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
o. iL TAYLOR STt:EL 
CJ'.:?ANY, a corporation, 
?.\~P~ \;. B YLOR and 
LJJ JEAi'1 1~. TAYLOR, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
I :J THE 
SUP~E11E C·OURT 
OF THS 
STATE OF UT.A'J 
Case tJo. 15707 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT 
KEENE CORPORATION 
STATE~E~T OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff-respondent Keene Corporation ("Keene") was 
'wardej judg'llent by the District Court in the a:nount of 
:66,674.16 as the agreed price for goods ordered by and sold and 
'.:::vered to Grating, Inc .• plus interest and attorney's fees, 
:;rsuant to absolute and unconditional trade account guarantees 
:i' defendants-appellants R. iJ. Taylor Steel Company ("Taylor 
"),Ralph W. Taylor and Lou Jean M. Taylor ("Taylors"). 
-1-
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DISPOSITIO~ I~ THE LOWER CO~RT 
In their Answer to plaintiff's Co'llolaint, the ::lefen.jar,t: 
admitted that the subject goo::ls had a reasonable value c~ 
$40,000.00 (R. 21) and asserted an 
I 
assortment of affirmative Oe· i 
fenses. (R. 22-23.) 
After Keene file::l its Notice of Readiness for Trial le .. 
77), the Taylors moved to stay the action in its entirety. (?. 
7 8 . ) The District Court granted in part and d en i e d in part t hi'. ! 
motion, ruling that the action would co:ne on regularly for trio'. i 
except for the defenses set forth in the Answer based upon vio· 
lations of the federal anti trust laws whic'.1 would be stave: 
Har~c:_'2_, Civil lfo. NC-75-21, pendin~ in the United States Dis· 
trict Court of Utah, Northern Division. (R. 110-111.) 
Trial of the case was then set for February 7, 1977. 
Faced with this firm trial setting, the defendants by Stipuli· 
tion, Motion and Order of January 25, 1977 (R. 115-119) volun· 
tarily admitted each and every factual allegation set forth ir 
Keene's Complaint an::l abandone::l with orejudice all de fense5 . 
· 1· <Sc' I lD ~ I 
i 
except certain antitrust claims which had been placed 
by Grating;, Inc. in its federal suit. Since these an ti trus1 
defenses had been stayed and all other claims and defense: 
resolved, the February 7, 1977 trial date was stricken. ( R. II: 
at 117' ,, 3 at 118.) The defendants, as absolute an'. 
-2-
I 
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unconditional trade account guarantors of Grating, Inc., ad-
~itted that Gr3.ting, In:;. ordered steel grating from Keene's 
~rice lists in the amount of $56,674.16, received and accepted 
the steel grating from Keene, and then refused to pay the 
invoice'.l list price or any part of it. 
a~ 115-11 6. ) 
(FL 111, 2, 3, 4, and 5, 
Keene then moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds 
that the Taylors had stioula ted that Grating, Inc. had failed to 
p'ly Keene the aq;reed price of goods admitte'.lly received; that 
tr.e Taylors had executed the unconditional trade account guaran-
tees of Grating. Inc.'s debts to Keene; that the Taylors had 
Wl iv e d a 11 de fens e s to the deb t except those based on a 11 e g e d 
i~titrust violations; and that, by the overwhelming weight of 
iuthoritv, such alleged a!'ltitrust violations could not, as a 
1atter of law. be asserted as a defense to a claim for the 
i~reed price of goods sold and delivered. (R. 120-129.) 
The lower court granted in part Keene's Motion for 
3u"imary Judgment by: 
1) Striking the antitrust defenses from the Taylors' 
<nswer as being unavailable as a matter of law (R. 165); and 
2) Vacating the Court's previous Order staying this 
iction pending the resolution of these antitrust defenses (R. 
161 ); and 
3) Awarding Keene partial judgment i!'l the amount of 
-3-
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$40,000.00 since the Taylors had admitted in their Answer anj i:. 
their own damage study that the goods were worth at least th;· 
amount. (R. •4 at 186 and 187.) 
The District Court did not grant judgment for the e~t'.r' 
$66,574.16 sought by Keene because it granted an oral motion~: 
counsel for the Taylors and T;:iylor Steel t•.:.i be relieved on t':' 
grounds of excusable neglect of his waiver with prejudice of tf, 0 
contractual defense that the written purchase orders by Grati,1r. 
Inc. and the invoices of Keene had been orally modified so the: 
11 one of the terms and conditions of the sale of goods by [Keene: 
to Grating, Inc. was that Gr;:iting, Inc. would be charged no ~or' 
than the price charged by other manufacturers for similar I 
goods. 11 (R. 164-165.) * 
Trial was held November 29 and 30, 1977, on this o~e 
remaining defense of the Taylors. (R. 254-429.) By Fin1inzs c' 
Fact and Conclusions of Law entered January 24, 1978 (R. 22]· 
233), the District Court held: 
1) Keene did not Pigree to charge Grating;, Inc. no ~ore 
than other manufacturers charged their customers. ( R. 1118 at 
226.) 
2) A.t the most, due to a mutual friendship between cer· 
tain representatives of Keene and Gratinc;, Inc., "Grating, Inc. 
* Counsel for the Taylors was also relieved of the waiver of on; 
other contractual defense on the crrounds of excusable negiec 
(R. 164-165) but later voluntarily abandoned that defens~· 
( R. 185-186. ) 
-4-
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sought and received assurances that it was purchasing steel 
~rating from Keene at a comoeti tive or ice which would enable 
'~ating, Inc. to resell such steel grating at a reasonable 
profit.' (R. ii19 at 226-227.) 
3) Althou;;h such assurances did not amount to a con-
tract, they were in fact fully performed by Keene in that (a) 
with regard to the price lists of the two other manufacturers 
th>t allegedly were lower than Keene's. one was not in effect in 
the area where Grating. Inc. did business arid only very limited 
anj insufficierit a'llounts of product were available fro'll the 
~anufacturer wit'1 the other (R. lls 24 and 25. at 227- 228); (b) 
3rating, Inc. resold the steel grating it purchased from Keene 
iw~ich was the subject of the action below) at a substantial 
profit considerably above its normal margin (R. 1126 at 228); and 
le) i\eene had kept Grating, Inc. fully competitive by oroviding 
its full require'llents of product during a period of severe 
chortage. ::Jroviding it price protection, oroviding it Keene's 
J•:n experienced personnel to aid in selling and providing other 
:a~i<eting assistance. (R. lls 27, 28, 29, at 228-229). 
~) Grating, Inc. picked up at least part of the steel 
?:·Hine; which is the subject of this action with no intention of 
"1ving for it, in that Gratini:s, Inc. sued Keene in federal court 
~or millions of dollars for anti trust violations wi thi'1 one day 
JfGrating, Inc.'s receipt of the last of the ship'.llents (R. ,130 
r· 
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at 229-230). Therefore, the District Court refused defendants' 
application for equitable relief (R. 1114 at 232) at le'l.st :, 
part due to Gratin", Inc.' s lack of "clean hancls'' and gocj 
faith . 
5) In any event, 'lny such alleged oral agreement wJ: 
not available to the Taylors and Taylor Steel as a defense unde: 
various provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code as enacte:l i:. 
Utah. (R. \Is 10, 11. 12, and 13 at 232.) 
Judgment was entered January 24, 1978, in the amount i' 
$ 6 6 , 6 7 4 . 1 6 p 1 us in t ere st , costs , and attorney ' s fee s in ar. 
amount to be cletermined by the Court. (R. 234-235.) At '3. late~ 
I 
date, after a hearing, the District Court entered judgment for 1 
attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $14,501.16 agains: 
the Taylors and Taylor Steel. (R. 245-246.) 
The Taylors and Taylor Steel filed an extensive an: I 
detailed motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions o'. I 
Law. (R. 208-214.) Tne District Court denied that motion afte' 
hearing. (R. 237- 238.) 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff-respondent Keene Corporation seeks the affir· 
mance by this Court of the District Court's Order of October 25, 
1977, striking the federal anti trust defenses, the Judgment anJ 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the merits entereo 
January 24, 1978; the Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclu· 
sions of Law as to costs and attorney's fees of March 17. 197 3· 
-6-
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31 j the Order denying the Motion to Alter or Amend the Findings 
Fact and Conclusions of L3.w dated March 17, 1978. 
STATEME~T OF FACTS WITH 
CI TA fIONS-TO-f:f'!E RSCOl:fD-
On April 26, 1973, the Taylors and Taylor Steel for 
nluable consideration entered into tr3.de account guarantees by 
:1c terms w'iich they absolutely and unconditionally gu'l.ranteej 
py11ent of 3.ll trade accounts thereafter incurred by Grating, 
:12. to Keene olus interest and attorney's fees. (Exhibit lP, 
:~2de Account Guarantees of the Taylors and Taylor Steel.) 
'2loh :,;, Taylor is the President 3.nd sole owner of Grating, Inc. 
21d also of R. w. Taylor Steel Company. Lou Jean M. Taylor is 
Mph \I. Taylor's wife. These unconditional trade account 
1uarantees were obtained by Keene because Grating, Inc. had run 
;c an unpaid trade account of so:ne $200,000.00 just prior to 
that ti:ne. (Exhibit 10?) 
During Janu3.ry and March. 1975, Gratins, Inc. ordered 
steel grating from t<eene in the total amount of $66,574.15 by 
,:~it ten purchase orders prepared and executed by Grating, Inc.' s 
10nen1 rnanager. Grating, Inc. knew the prices Keene charged 
from price lists which had been previously provided. By in-
"rting these prices from Keene's or ice lists in the ourchase 
:~ 1 ers and executing the'll, Grating, Inc. agreed to pay these 
S'.ated prices. (Purchase orders contained in Exhibits 2P, 3P, 
IP, SP, 6P, 7P, 8P and 9P.) From March 31, 1975, to Aoril 17, 
-7-
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1975, Grating, Inc. accepted anj received steel grating fro: 
Keene in the quantity and r!escription and at the price specifie: 
by Grating, Inc. iri its purchase orders and as set forth in th: 
invoices sent by Keene to Grating, Inc. (Exhibits 2P throu;'' 
9P.) Grating, Inc. and the defendants after repeated demand: 
refused to pay Keene the invoiced indebtedness. 
The purchase or.jers and invoices reflecting the purch3s: 
and sale of these goods at an agreed price were the written co~.· 
tractual documents between Grating, Inc. and Keene. Previou: 
written agreements between these entities relating to the our· 
chase of steel gratirig by Grating, Inc. had expired long ago b ! 
1968. These previous written agree'llents did not contain any 
suggestion that Grating, Inc. would be charged no more than th: 
price charged by other manufacturers for similar goods. 
At no time between 1968 and APril 18, 1975, did Keene 
and Grating, Inc. agree orally or in writing that the Purchas: 
orders and invoices for sales between these entities 
modified so that Grating, Inc. would be charged no more 
would be I 
than the 
At 'h' I price charged by other manufacturers for similar goods. · 
I d,. I most, certain representatives of Keene and of Grating, nc. 
veloped a mutual frieridship Pursuant to which Gratinf!, In~· 
sought and received assurance that it was "competitive". (Trial 
Transcript R. pp. 274, 275 and 279, testimony of Ralph 11 · 
Taylor; pp. 331, 332 and 333, testimony of Brent Cox; PP· 37o, 
-8-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
399 and 400, testimony of Jerry McGee; pp, 406, 407, 408, and 
<11, testimony of Theron John.) These representatives of Keene 
a~j Grating, Inc. were all persons of subst3.ntial experience in 
the business of purch3.sing, selling, and fabric3. ting steel 
grating and had equal opportunity to determine the prices 
cnarged by other manufacturers. (Trial Transcript R. p. 264, 
testi:nony of Ralph W. Taylor; op. 327 to 328, testimony of Brent 
Cox. ) 
During March and Aoril, 1975, Grating, Inc. discovere,i 
that certain other manufacturers including HARSCO and Dravo, 
currently had lower orice lists for steel grating than Keene. 
(Trial Transcript R. 
faylor; Sxhibit 130 
pp. 275 and 276, testimony of Ralph W. 
Dravo Price List and Exhibit 16D HARSCO 
Price List.) The price lists of these two companies were lower 
than Keene because HARSCO and Dravo each had a "mill or factory 
position'' with steel manufacturers entitling them to purchase 
steel at lower orices than Keene could purchase the s3.me mate-
rial. (Trial Transcript R. op. 307 and 308, testi11ony of Glenn 
;, Johnson; p. 323, testimony of Allen H. Streeter; p. 377, 
:esti:nony of Jerry McGee.) Keene's price to Grating, Inc. was 
i~.crease::l at aporoximacely the s3.me percentage rate as the price 
~eene was forced to pay for steel it purchased. (Trial Trans-
cript R. pp. 376-377. testimony of Jerry V. McGee.) 
Moreover, the price list of Hl\RSCO in effect during 
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January through April. 1975, was not applicable in the ge0• 
graphic territory in which Grating, Inc. sold. (Price List 
I 
dated 6-12-74 of Exhibit 16D; Trial Transcript R. pp. 314, JF 
and 316, testi11ony of Allen H. Streeter.) In fact, s1les c' 
steel grating by HARSCO i!'l the area in which Grating, Inc. ii: I 
business during December throui;h April, 1975, were very close:: 
the prices Keene charged Grating, Inc. (Tri1l Transcript R. oo. 
3 1 8 , 3 1 9 , 3 2 0 and 3 2 3 , test i mo n y o f A 11 en H . Streeter . ) Th er:- I 
fore, the prices at which HARSCO actually sold in this ·narko: 
were competitive with the prices at which Grating, Inc. bougr1: 
material from Keene, and vice-versa. 
With regard to the price list of Dravo, only ve~·: 
limited quantities of steel grating with '3ubstantially delave· 
delivery were available from the Dravo price list in effec: 
during January through April, 1975. cind the entire qu1ntit' 
available for this market was sold to ~1esco-Utah Sprock"t, 
Dravo's sole 
Grating, Inc. 
representative 
did business. 
in the geographical 
(Trial Transcript R. 
area w~er' 
pp. 301-J~ .. 1 
testimony of Glenn T. Johnson; October 15, 1974 Dravo Price LiS'. 
of Exhibit 1 3D.) Consequently, Dravo' s price list had no m1te· 
rial effect on Grating, Inc.'s abilitv to be comoetitive. 
Although there was no agreement or understanding tha: 
Keene Corporation would sell as low or lower than any othe' 
, I 
since Gra tini:;, Inc. was the 50"' manufacturer of steel grating, 
-10-
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seller of Keene Corporation's grating products in the Utah 
market are:i., Keene was deter'llined to and did keep Grating, Inc. 
fJlly competitive. 
Jerry McGee.) 
(Tri:3.l Transcript li. p. 36J, testi'llony of 
That Keene kept Gratinis, Inc. competitive as to price 
1,ith regard to the specific isoods involvej in this case is 
evident from the fact that Grating, Inc. readily resold the 
steel grating it purchased from Keene (assuming Keene had been 
paid for such grating! at a substantial profit ranging from ap-
proxim3.tely 15% to in excess of 30%, which was considerably more 
than Gratinq, Inc.' s normal profit margin. (Trial Transcript R. 
pp. 257 and 288, testi:nony of Ralph W. T1ylor; pp. 349 through 
J51 anj 36c, testimony of Brent Cox, Exhibits 12P, 24P. 29P, 
JG?, 31P, 32P, 33P. 34P, 35P, 36P, 37P, 38P and 39P.) 
Furthermore, Keene kept Grating, Inc. competitive as to 
price ~enerally because durini; Grating, Inc.'s fiscal year 1974 
(April 1, 1974 throug;h March 31, 1975) Grating, Inc. had net 
ear 01ings of $128,031.00 which was far in excess of what Grating, 
:~c. h1d made in any previous year. These earnings were exclu-
sive of a salary payment to Ralph Taylor as Gratirn;, Inc.'s 
~hief executive officer of $127,610.00, even thouish Mr. Taylor 
socnt very little time on behalf of Grating, Inc. (Trial 
:ranscript R. pp. 292-294, testi:nony of Ralph W. Taylor; p. 338, 
testimony of Brent Cox.) 
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Because of the steel shortage in effect from the f 311. 
1973 through the spring of 1975, the '!lost significant requir:-
rnent to be competitive was the obtainin:i; of' 3n ajeau~te sus:: 
of steel grating. If the oroduct could be obtained, it couU: 
easily resold at a substantial profit. Keene kept Grat in~, !~.:. 
competitive during the steel sriortaq;e bv promptly '3UDDlyin5 :· 
with its full reauirement of steel gratin~ at a time when ~~ 
did not have adequate steel gratin:s even to supply its : 
needs. (Trial Transcript R. p. 285, testimony of Ralc~ 
Taylor; p. 309, testimony of Allen H. Streeter; p. 356, test· 
rnony of Brent Cox; pp. 377-379, 382, 399-400, testimony of Jen 
McGee.) 
Keene also kept Grating, Inc. competitive by providi'.. 
it with price protection, so that Grating, Inc. could bU: 
jobs with guarantees against any future or ice increases. T'.:: 
was important because the price of steel charsed Keene by ste: 
manufacturers was rapidly rising. Neither HARSCO nor Dre. 
provided such price protection to their customers. (Tri: 
Transcript R. pp. 291 to 292, testimony of Raloh W. Taylor; i'. 
380 to 381, testimony of Jerry McGee.) 
Keene also kept Grating, Inc. comoetitive by Keene'so; 
regional sales mana5er, at Keene's own cost and expense, fre· 
quently 
Grating, 
and the 
visiting the Grating, Inc. 
Inc. in its sales effort by 
like. Neither HARSCO nor 
-12-
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customers· (Trial Transcript R. po. 285 and 286, testimony of 
Ralph W. Taylor; pp. 358 and 359, testimony of Brent Cox; pp. 
378 and 380, testi110ny of Jerry McGee; pp. 405 and 406, testi-
:1Jny of Theron John.) 
Keene further kept Grating, Inc. competitive by provid-
ing it special low prices on large jobs. In fact, Keene sub-
stantially discounted to Grating, Inc. some of the very steel 
gnting wnich is the subject of this action. (Exhibit 25P; 
!rial Transcript R. pp. 349. 368, testi'llony of Brent Cox.) 
Keene never sold to other custo'llers at a price lower 
than it crnrged Grating, Inc. 
testimony of Jerry V. McGee.) 
(Trial Transcript R. p. 380, 
Grating, Inc. picked up and accepted delivery at Keene's 
Dlant in Santa Fe Sorings, California of at least part of the 
steel ~rating which is the subject of this action, with full 
knowledge that other manufacturers may have been charging less 
:·c~ the same product to the extent that such product was avail-
able. (Trial Transcript R. p. 275, testimony of Ralph W. 
la Y 1 or , Find in g of Fa c t R . ,13 O at pp . 2 2 9 - 2 3 0 ) . Grating; , Inc . 
accepted delivery of Keene's goods without objectins to Keene's 
stated price and apparently without the intention of paying for 
the~, because on April 18, 1975, at or about the same time it 
accepted delivery of some of the goods and before actually using 
r' such goods, Grating, Inc. sued Keene in the United St3.tes Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division for 
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several million dollars for 3lleged antitrust viol3tions. ~een: 
was advised in response to repeated demanjs for p3yment t~;· 
Gratin;; would not pay either in whole or in p3rt for such ~oo:s. 
(Tri a 1 Trans c r i pt R . p . 2 8 1 , test i '110 n y of Br e '1 t Cox ; Exhibit 90: 
Complaint and Request for Tri3l by Jury. Exhibit 11D.) 
ARGUMENT 
P'.:lINT I. 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DETERMI~ED THAT 
VI'.:lLATION OF s~:TIOY 1 OF THE SHER~AN ANTITRUST ACT 
MAY '~OT BE A::;SERTED AS A DS"'ENSE TO THIS SIMPLE 
COLLE::::TIOtJ ACTION 3RJJGHT B THE STATE COURT TO 
RECOVER TnE AGREED PRICE OF GOODS SOLD A~!D 
DELIVERED. 
(3) Since Tne Construction And Enforcement Of 
The Anti trust Laws Of The United States Are 
Placed Exclusively In The Federal Courts Py 
Section 15 Of The Cl3yton Antitrust ~ct, 
Violations Of The Antitrust L3ws M3V Not Ee 
Asserted In St3.te Courts Either Py Vlav cc 
Counterclaim Or Defense. 
Enforcement of the 3ntitrust laws of the United St3te' 
is placed exclusively in the federal courts by statute. Secti:' 
15 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C.A. Section 15. There· 
fore, when a party seeks to assert a violation of the antitrus'. 
laws of the United States either as a defense or counterclaim t: 
a suit brought in st3.te court, the st3.te courts have stricker J 
-14-
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:~ 2 defense or counterclaL11. American Broadcast v. American 
- - -- ------~- ---------- --------
~[c_~_.__t!u_t..__ln_~:__c:_'2_._, 249 tl.Y.S.2d 431 (1963); Q_§_n_~r::il.LJ_~ltil2.€i 
'ictu_c_§_s_C_'2r:r2'2r::il.U'2Q_v_.__Q_~_t1il.1'.'.~~. 279 N.W. 750 (Minn. 1938); A.MF 
~in~tiC'.t.t.<:r_~,__I_n_g_,__v_._ _ _.1i_~r::tin_~-2_'2iilil'2€::_ _ _ln_g__._, 110 N .:.J. 2d 348 
:''.inn. 1961); ~'2b.11__~il_r_r_~u_r::g§_~~LQ.t'._~t'._a __ ~u_r::~~~__9_i!__~'2rl!.j.)_il_QLY__.___1=:__._ 
(Ct. App. La. 1965); 
C2f!J'· 344 S.'vl.2d 180 (Tex. Civ. App. 1951). As. the Supreme 
Whether by way of attack or defense, once raised, 
the issue is the same. Its deter~ination in either 
case would require this court to e.pply federal law, 
the constri;ction of which is expressly a'1d exclu-
sively placed with the federal courts. Id. at 753. 
Tne District Court. therefore. correctly struck de fen-
1
"
1t's 0>ntitrust defenses in this action as not being cognizable 
::.' th2 courts of this state. 
Gratinr;, Inc., as previously stated, has com11enced an 
'2'.ion in the U:Jited States District Court for the District of 
':: 3h alleginis various anti trust violations against Keene Corpo-
'o::sn. Since the courts of this State cannot and should not be 
':JJirej to interpret and construe the antitrust laws of the 
"h:ted States, the resolution of Grating, Inc. is antitrust 
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claims must be left to the federal court. 
(b) By The Overwhel'lling Weight Of The Case L'>w. 
As Well As The .Specific Re:nedies Provifoj 
By Federal Law For Any Violation Of Section 
I Of The Sher'llan Antitrust ftct, Privat~ 
Contracts For The Agreed Price Of Goods 
Sold And Delivered May Not Be Avoided Even 
In Federal Courts (Which Have Jurisdiction 
To Consider Federal An ti trust Laws) On The 
Basis Of An Alleged Violation Of The 
Federal Antitrust Laws. 
As previously indicated, Keene received judgrnent f:' 
$66,674.16 plus costs, interest and attorney's fees int~~ 
action, under unconditional trade account guarantees of t'-
Taylors and Taylor Steel for g;oods sold and delivered t 
Grating, Inc. at the price and in the quantity Gratin;;, In:, 
itself provided on purchase orders sent to Keene. 
and Taylor Steel atte:noted to set forth as a defense to '.' 
collection of this admitted debt that Keene had violated Secti0' 
of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. §1. Th us, accordi:,: 
to defendants, Keene owed Grating, Inc. more money than Grati:: 
Inc. owed Keene. Grating, Inc.' s federal an ti trust claims we:: 
the subject of an action pending in the United States Distrie'. 
Court for the District of Utah, Northern Division. Q_r:_§.~i~£i.-~~: 
-16-
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~,_f ~~r:i_~_f_()_f'.Q_Qf'.§_ t ior~ ___ §_rl_ d__H__§_r::_~ c. ()_. l~C- 7 5-21 , f i 1 ed Ao r i 1 1 8, 1975. 
Gefendants claim the District Court below erred in striking this 
Jefense. 
The U. S. Supreme Court on several occasions has hel'.l 
:~'lt federal antitrust viol'1tions may not be asserted as a de-
fense to a contract action even in federal court, and in par-
ticular, an action to recover the agreed price of goods sold an'.l 
:elivered. ~e_:!:_:!:_~_'-'_.'..__~()_~~[~, 358 U.S. 516, 79 S.Ct. 429, 3 L.Ed. 
2~ 475 (1959); (;_()_rl_rl_()_gy_~_J!__ri_t.2r:i__~e_~e_r::__f_:i:_12_e__f_()__:_, 184 U.S. 540, 
'' 3. Ct. 4 3 1 , 4 5 L. Sd . 6 7 9 ( 1902); p_.'..__B__:__\itlc!_e_r__Jif~_:__f()_:__'{~ orr:i_ 
~c~~ll_C.~~-B_e_f:i:._ri_inc_c;_()_._, 236 U.S. 165. 35 S.Ct. 398, 59 L.Ed. 520 
SJ S.Ct. 1015, 91 L.Ed. 1219 (1947); 6.__:_.2__:_~1!'.~E__f_()__:__'-'__:__L~n'!!?.CJ.!':.Q 
:_l~,. 267 ~J.S. 248, 45 S.Ct. 3C!O, 69 L.Ed. 597 (1925). 
mw1 2arloads of onions set up an antitrust '.lefense to a sell-
er' s action for the purchase price. In refusing to oermit the 
Jef2nse, the U.S. Supreme Court stated: 
As a defense to an action based on contract, the 
Plea of illegality based on violation of the 
Sherman Act h':ls not met with much favor in this 
Court. I_tl_i'.?._Q§_~_!?_eer:i__l'!._()_t_§_!?_lY_t_l}~§_~e__lih§.f'.§__!I}§_ 
Q_~_e_§__t:J_ §_~!?_ e_§_Q_ri:'.§.Q.§__!?_y __ ~-J2~ r::_q_ ha ~e_r:_!r:i__ ~1!-~g __ t i2r:i__!:_()_ 
rec ()_'-'_e_r::_ __ f!':.CJ.ri:'.._hl-_ ~l}§._§.E§. §.Q_2-!':. t.soe__()_L_ ~()_Qcj_'.?._~ Q:!:_Q_ · 
(Citing (;_CJ_rl_!l_()_l_:!:_y, ~~~!':_§_; 12.__:__B__:__l-{i:!:_cj__e_r::_ _ __t'1fg_:__(;_2_., 
su12_ra; and l\ _ _:_2_:_~al:!:__Co_:_, ~~ra.) 358 U.S. at 
518, 79 S.Ct. at 431. (Emphasis Added) 
The courts have indicated several reasons for not per-
-~lting alleged antitrust violations to be asserted in actions 
-17-
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for the agreed price of goods sold and delivered. Each of tie 
reasons is applicable to this case. 
First, an express re:nedy is provided by federal law'.: 
violation of the Sher:nan Act, i.e., treble d::ma,:ses. 1 5 u. s.c. 
§15. "[T]he Sherman Act's express remedies could not be a1:• 
to judicially by including the avoidance of private contract" 
a sanction." 
174-175, 35 s.ct. at 401-402). ;'[T]he federal courts should n 
be quick to create a policy of nonenforcement of contracts b• 
yond th3t which is clearly the requirement of the Sherman A~:. 
~~l~~· Ko~~~' ~~~~~, 358 U.S. at 519, 79 S.Ct. 3t 431. 
Second, no need exists to exp3nd the substantial re~: 
of treble damages to permit antitrust defenses to contract 2:· 
tions. Defendants argue that if Keene's alleged antitrust v> 
lations were permitted as a defense and in fact proved, Kee· 
would be entitled only to a recovery of $40,000.00 as:· 
reasonable value of the goods, rather than the contract price· 
$66,674.16. Keene's entitlement to the remainder, sav ~ 
defendants, must await the resolution of the federal antitr·;' f 
case. However, the U.S. Supreme Court decisively disposed. 
Bruce's sought to defend a state court acti· Pi 
for the agreed price of goods sold by asserting; an antitr'; 
-18-
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;. 
·iiolation by the American C3n Comp'lny as a defense. Bruce's, as 
~o defendants in this action, also sued t'ie Can Co:npany for 
treole damages in federal court for an antitrust violation. 330 
•J.S. at 752, 67 S.Ct. at 1019. In affirming the Florida Supreme 
:curt' s nold ing that federal law would not permit t!'le anti trust 
defense in the state court action, the U.S. Supreme Court held: 
No reason suggests itself why Congress should have 
intended a remedy by which the victim of discrimi-
nation could recover by defense [in a state court 
action for the agreed price of goods sold] only 
one-third of what he could recover. on the same 
proof, by offen~e [in the federal court anti trust 
action] .... Since the remedy embed ied in [ oer:ni tting 
an antitrust defense in the st3.te cour't action] 
would be but 3. weak one-third shadow of the one 
Congress expressly gave, we c3nnot see the need for 
j u d i c i 3 1 red u o 1 i cation in in in i 3. tu re . 3 3 0 U . S . at 
757, 67 S.Ct. at 1022; (M3.terial in brackets 
added). See also Dickstein v. Dupont, 443 F.2d 783 
at 786 (First Cir.1971)-::--------------
T1e S3me is, of course. true in the case at bar. No need exists 
to per'llit defendants in this case to assert that Keene is enti-
tied to only a partial recovery of $40,000.00 because of an 
;~titrust defense. This would not further any policy of deter-
i1g antitru.st violations (as defendants claim in their brief, 
t· 
Piges 15-15), since if they can prove such violations in their 
r;' 
fe]eral court action, their remedy is trebled by virtue of the 
d 
fejeral st3tute. 
Third, if the antitrust defense were oermitted to the 
Par·ticular sale of goods here involved by Keene to Grating, 
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Inc., all Kee:ie' s sales 
As the U. S. Supreme Court has indicatei: 
If this vie;; is taken, certai'1ly t'-' 0 re::-.e::'; ·,;oulj 
soon end il 1 e gal [ a 11 e g e ::'. an ti tr us t ,, ::. '.l lat i '.l :i s J -
by ending [Keerie' s] Dusi·-1ess. · .. ,·2 jo t:J":. 8elisvi: 
Congress has co:ite:nplated so deajly a rernejy or has 
left the way ope:: to us !:>y judicial edict t2 :lis-
locate business as such a holdi:ig would do. It 
rnust :iot be forgotte:i thac suc'i 3. decisior: W:Julj 
have retroactive effect for several vears ar.:: un-
settle many accounts. We cannot justify a ju::icial 
declaration to this effect. Sr:.ice' s Juices v. 
American Can C'.:l., 330 J.S. at ·-t51'-.-e,-7-3~-:;t,~--at To2o-:-- -\11aterTa_l_i n brae ke ts a:ld e J) . 
1"ourth, the availability of antitrust defenses ·'wou: 
tend to prolon5 and cornplicate contract '.lis9utes. '' U icksteir. ·, 
Q~oont, 443 F.2'.l at 78, (First Cir. 1971). T'1is si'llole coll::-
tion action for the agreed price of goods sold was file1 ' 
June, 1975 and jud5'.Tlent was rendere'.l in Jariuary, 1975. 
defendants have avoi1ed judgrne:it on tnis adCiitted debt for OV'' 
three years by :r.erely asserti'1g a:-i antitr'Jst defense. ~.1:· 
delay would increase geo".letrically if the arititrust defense wer• 
per:nitted. Collection s'1ould not be reouired to await trial:· 
a protracted antitrust case. 
Thus, since this case falls squ'l.rely wi ti1in e3.ch reas:: 
the U.S. Supreme Court has articulated why antitrust defen 5'' 
to contract actions are seldo::i, if ever, oer:nitted, the 1ef::· 
dants must convincingly dernonstrate that this case falls wit',:· 
the narrow ambit of circu:nstances where the defense has w· 
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per~itted as discussed next below. 
(c) The District Court's Enforcement Of The 
Price And Quantity Terms Of Grating, Inc.'s 
Own Purchase Orders To Keene Corporation 
Which Are The Subject Of This Action Was 
tlot So Clearly Intrinsically Or Inherently 
Illegal As To Make The Court Party To En-
forcing The Precise Conduct Or One Of The 
Very Restraints Forbidden By The Antitrust 
Laws. 
The O. S. Supreme Court has recognized a very li'.r.ited 
anj narrow exception to the assertion of an antitrust defense to 
icontract claim. The defense is permissible only where the in-
trinsic or inherent illegality of the contract is so clear that 
enforcement would make a court party to the precise conduct or 
to the carrying out of one of the very restraints forbidden by 
:rn. I!.ic;_is_§._~eif!._~'..__P_!.!_2ont_, ~1:!.2!::_~; ~~gy_~~-~~~1:!.g_§l., ~1:!.12.r:§l.. ~f!l.~E 
~c_l,_~IJ!l?_or~, ~upra. 
test is th 3 t 
As the Court stated in ~~llY_'{.'.._~~~~g_~, the 
... past the point where the judgment of the Court 
would itself be enforcing the precise conduct made 
unlawful by the Act, the courts_a_r_e ___ fo beguided by 
the overriding general policy, as Mr. Justice 
Hol'lles put it, "of preventing people from getting 
other people's property for nothing when they our-
port to be buying it.'; 358 U.S. 520-521, 79 S.Ct. 
432. (Emphasis added). 
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As far as Keene can ascertain from defendants' bri,• 
(pp. 15-18) they rely upon this narrow exception to the gener;. 
rule. 
In their brief, defendants set forth (pp. 8-9) a "PreL. 
minary Statement Concerning Pending Federal Antitrust Claim; 
without any citatio:.~ to the record. In this so-called 'Preli·· 
inary Statement'', it is asserted that the pen,.jing federal cour·. 
anti tru.~t action between Grating. Inc. and Keene involves• 
sche11e whereby Keene somehow forced Gr::i. ting, Inc. to rese: 
fabricated steel grating at '3. price set by Keene which in tur· 
permitted Keene to overcharge Gr3.ting, Inc. for steel gr3.tin;l 
the wholesale level, i.e., to charge Grating, Inc. more tn:· 
other manufacturers ch3.rged for the same product. Later o· 
defendants confusingly 3.ssert that this is not the p:articu'.: 
claim involved in the federal court antitrust action b~ 
instead, th3.t ' ... Keene was guilty of unlawfully fixing prices, 
--presumably of the steel grating it sold to Grating, Inc. ('., 
17, Appellants' brief.) 
Next, defendants claim th3.t the "undisputed fair mark:· 
value" of the steel grating in issue in this 3.Ction "3 
$40,000.00. (p. 15, Apoellants' Brief) Yence, conclude defe~· 
dants, the lower court should h3.V e 1 imi ted its judgrnen t to th;: 
amount and should have stayed that judisment, 3.S well as V 
action for the balance of the contract price, pending t•• 
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,iutcome of the an ti trust action. According to defendants. this 
:ourse of action would have balanced competing policies of the 
i 3 w by oreventing defendants fro:n being ''unjustly enriched'' 
·,;hile at the same time preventing the court from any possibility 
1owever re:note of enforcing agreements which tangentially relate 
to alleged violations of the antitrust laws. 
orief, op. 15-13.) 
(Appellants' 
The argument is invalid for a number of reasons: 
First, defendants are playing fast and loose with this 
::urt if they are, in fact, representing that Keene and HARSCO, 
the other defendant in the antitrust action, fixed the price o: 
the steel grating sold to Grating, Inc. so that the District 
:ourt's enforcement of the purchase orders and invoices involved 
i'1 this case enforced the ''precise conduct'' forbidden by the 
3:1er:nan Act. Defenjants themselves proved at the trial of this 
case that Keene's price lists to Gratinis, Inc. and HARSCO's 
1rice lists to others were, in fact, very different. (Exhibit 
cont3.ining 
'·'ene's prices.) 
:~ this action 
HARSCO's prices and Exhibit 41D containing 
Indeed, defendants' entire criticism of Keene 
is that Keene char15ed Grating, Inc. a price 
''isher than charged by other manufacturers to Grating, Inc.'s 
:c~:ieti tors. Therefore, no possible antitrust defense can be 
:er~itted based on defendants' assertion of a price fix between 
1
' teene and HARSCO of the steel grating sold to Grating, Inc. 
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Defendants themselves have disproved such a pricing arrangement. 
Second, if defendants 3.re arguing that the federal ant:. 
trust action involves the cl3.irn th3.t Keene was charging Gratin; 
Inc. more than other manuf3.cturers were ch3.rging their CU'· 
tomers, no such cl3.i01 is cognizable under the 3.ntitrust l3i'. 
Moreover, even if such alleged overcharge were 1 inked with so'.• 
other antitrust viol3.tion involving Grating, Inc.'s sale p~i: 
to its customers, the enforcement of 3. contract for the a~re' 
price of goods sold and delivered to Gr3.tin[\, Inc. suc'i as r:· 
fleeted by the purchase orders and invoices involved in t'.: 
action (Exhibits 2P throug;h 9P) wouU not constitute the e·.· 
forcement of the "precise conduct'' or "one of the very r•· 
strain t s " forbidden b y the She r:n:i. n Act . Obviously, it is no: 
violation of law for Keene to prove that steel g;rating was so: 
and delivered to Gr3.ting;, Inc. at a stated price. As the UnW 
States Supreme Court said in Bruce's Juices: 
... [plaintiff] can prove that cans were soU and 
delivered at a stated price. That is no violation 
of law. 330 U.S. 743 at 756, 67 S.Ct. 1015 at 1021. 
Third, ~\'.'.E!.!:.Y_c_§.~E!_, both state anj federal. which h> 
interpreted ~E!_],_l_y_'{~_r:;_!,l_sug~, has held without qu3.lific3.tion tr,; 
3.n anti trust defense based on the Sher'll3.n Act or otherwise c; 
never be asserted to a contract claim if the contract invo!V! 
is one for the 3.greed price of ;;;oods sold and delivered. 
other words, 3.11 courts interpreting ~E!_1:_l_y_ __ \'.'.· ___ K_~~l!.in ha·: 
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,,. 
I:, 
concluded that the enforcement of a contract for the agreed 
price of goods sold and delivered never can be enforcing the 
'precise conduct' maae illegal by the Sherman Act. As the court 
Inc .. 1973-1 Trade Cases, Par. 74,578 at 94,551 ('LY. S.Ct. 
1973): 
The defense of violation of the antitrust laws does 
not lie to per'lli t a purchaser to avoid payin:i; for 
goods or services admittedly received. (Citing 
~e_l),y_v:._iQ~l!_g_§_. ~1:!_2_t::_§_.) 
02r. 74,92G at 94,146 (E.D. Mich. 1974), the Court held that it 
,;is ·'settled'' that violations of the antitrust laws could not be 
isserted by either a principal debtor or an unconditional trade 
iccount guarantor ''where the plea has been made by the purchaser 
h 2n action to recover from hi'll the agreed price of goods 
U. (quoting f:_§.1=_1=_y_V'._,__~osug_§_.) 
:_~~---~.___l§.Q~§.~_i_r_Q~l!.~H2-rl_~,__l_ri_~, 365 F. Supo. 1264, 1974-1 
;ra1e Cases, Par. 74,666 (S.D. N.Y. 1974). the Court recognized 
th1t there was perhaps an implied exception to the rule that 
''
1titrust defenses could not be asserted on contract claims 
ihere the judgment of the Court would itself be enforcing the 
Precise conduct made unlawful by the act .... " or where "the 
irvalidity is inherent to the contract." The Court, however, 
\el.J this i'llplied exception could never be found in a contract 
ha·: 
:,~the sale of goods: 
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Such inherent invalidity may perhaps be fou'ld i~ 
resale price maintenance agreements, exclusion fro::; 
territories agreements, group boycotts. or overall 
illegal schemes to monopolize. These are merelv 
illustrative of 11hat I take to be inherently in-
valid agreements. A contract for the sale of 
_g__22?.~· •. ~ r::_§_g_~r::?.1§_s~ -_2r-=-~~~-c:-~-g_-r:Q~~~-'--=~~=~ri:~:L::J:n: 
h_§_r::_§_!']_!:_!_y__:iJ~_'-':~-1:_i,_d_ ... 1uTnless the act ordered by the 
Court is itself illegal, the contract is not sub-
ject to the antitrust defense. 368 F.Supp. at 
1278, 1974-1 Trade Cases, Par. 74,856 at 95,859. 
(Emphasis Added) 
In f_r::!'-':§_!_lQ_ __ '-':~___i_Q1:!_C_Br2~t:!§_r:'.!?_,_!_!']_C:~· 1976-2 Trade Cases p, 
61,19 at 70,404 (E.D. Wis. 1976), an action for food. suppL' 
and advertising expense, the Court held "the clear import 
?;_§__1_-!:._y is the rejection of the plea of Sherman Act illei:;ality 
a defense to a contract action.'' Id. 
Lastly, defendants claim that Keene would be unjus: 
enriched if the antitrust defense were not permitted. De;': 
dants assert that if Keene received a deferred judgrnent 
$40,000.00 and its entitlement to the remainder up to $66,67-. 
awaited the outcome of' the federal antitrust case. this~:. 
prevent Keene from being unjustly enriched. But at no ti~e: 
Keene agree that the reasonable value of the goods in issue· 
$40,000.00. The District Court entered partial summary jud5!· 
Ur 
Sl 
in that amount as its order reflects because defendants' Ans' 
admitted the goods were worth that amount and defendants' da'. 
an 
study showed they owed Keene at least that amount. (Order· 
a: 
Partial Summary Judgment, R. ~14, 186-187.) \Ii thout citatio~ 
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:he record or argument jefendants seek a stay pending resolution 
~: tne antitrust case, not only for the difference between the 
asreej contract price and $40,000.00 but also for the $40,000.00 
as well (p. 24, Appellant's brief). However, as previously in-
:~~ate'.l, the courts, including the U. S. Supreme Court, have 
a:r2dy considered the balancing of the policies of preventing 
Jr.just enrich'nent w'iile also 
Po 
insuring compliance with the 
1·1titrust laws. They uniformly have ruled that antitrust 
Je!enses are not available to contract actions except in the 
Brrow situation 11here the court is asked to enforce the precise 
conduct 11ade illegal by the Sherman Act. Thus, the courts have 
ceteri'lined, as defendants recognize in their brief (p. 16) that 
US'. 
:>.e policy of not furthering the purooses of violators of the 
e;: 
. antitrust Liws is less important than preventing people fro'll 
1'ttinQ other people's property for nothing when they purport to 1[\. ' ~ 
C:'. ~uying it. Furthermore, defendants themselves most certainly 
<1oui·1 be enriched unjustly if this action were stayed in whole 
ne : 
c~ ic, part and the antitrust defenses were permitted. It is 
Je , 
unJisputed that Grating, Inc. ordered, received, resold at a 
dt' 
Scostantial profit and refused to pay for $66,674.16 worth of 
Ans• 
\rathg fro.'1 Keene an'i then immediately sued Keene for alleged 
da'. 
antitrust violations. 
er ' 
a: Keene's expense for 
cior 
c~earer case of unjust 
Thus, Grating, Inc. obtained a war chest 
prosecution of its antitrust suit. No 
enrichment could exist than to permit 
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defendants to obtain Keene's goods under the guise of purchas'.· 
them, refusing to nay, making large profits on the goojs 
resale and financing a lawsuit a<:r,ainst Keene with the proceeds. 
Defendants have cited only two cases where an antitr;• 
defense has been permitted in a contract action, one in 19oq :· 
the other in 193 5. ~~ri_!'._:!:_Q_~l1_1::.a_l_\,la_ hL~a_~~r'-~Q :._"'.:._~~~i~_'{_2_~f~'._ 
~~rl_~-~<:l..:.• 212 U.S. 227 (1909); tia_r:_a_th<:i_11__Q~h~:._"'._:.__Jia_cg~y, 1. 
S.w.2d 8'33 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935) (miscitd by defendants as· 
S.W.2d 883). In ~<:l.!:!.1::.iri_~Q_t_a_-!:__~a_g __ Pa12_~r:_--~~ ..... nearly all t 
manuf3.cturers of wallpaper in the United St3.tes for~1ej a cc·· 
poration to purchase all their wallp3.per supplies at prices s• 
by them. P·.ese manufacturers then only made wallpaper availit: 
and only filled orders placed with the corporation represent'.· 
the pool. All wholesalers who purchcised the w3.llnaper w:: 
forced to do so from the pool's corporation at prices fixed· 
the manufcicturers otherwise they could get no paper. If t• 
wholesalers did not come into the agreement, the manufactur,· 
could drive the'll out of business. In a suit for the price 
goods sold brought by the pool corporation against a wholes 2:• 
who was a party to the price fix agreement, the U. S. Suprr 
Court voided the contract. 
But nothing like this egregious set of circumstan> 
exists in the present case. Grating, Inc. does not clai'TI it'" 
forced to become a member of an industry wide illegal pr:· 
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fixing scheme. Cirat:Lng. Inc. does not claim Keene was a nominal 
seller on behalf of other grating manufacturers in the U. S. 
crating, Inc. cannot claim. and in fact, itself disproved at the 
:rial of this action, that the price of the steel grating it 
ourchased fro'll Keene was fixed. The fact situation of this 
action, therefore, is in no way similar to the nationwide price 
r1xin::; sche·~.e in the fo_ri_t:~ri_E:_Q1':~~-~~ll case, where the defendant 
was p3.rt and parcel of the illegal agreement. Further, Conti-
nentd Wall apparently has never been followed by any other 
ccurt, includin:; the Uriited States Supreme Court. I.t has only 
been distin"uis'ied. 
~~[~ri_~ri_g__c_o__._, 2jo U.S. at 177-178; A.B. Small Co. v. Lamborn & 
--------------------------
J.S. at 520-521, 79 S.Ct. at 432. One eminent commentator has 
stated: 
Al though not expressly overrul in is the Continental 
\.,lall Paoer case, the Court abandoned the--cf:Lstinc: 
t1on-ma3e- there between contracts inherently il-
legal and those which are only collateral to the 
illegal activities. In Kellv, the Court heU t'iat 
the adequacy of antitrust-violations as a defense 
to an action on a contract depends not upon whether 
the violations were inherent in the contract sued 
upon, but upon whether the Court, in enforcing the 
contract, "would itself be enforcing the precise 
conduct made unlawful by the l\ct." Von Kalinowski, 
Antitrust and Trade Regulation, Volume 15, §109.06 
at1o9=-s1_a_n_d __ Tcfg-::B2-.- ·-----
.;~Jther comment3.tor has stated: 
n9·ier been followed in the almost 62 years that have passed 
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since it was decided.' Sobel, ~r:i_t_it_r:ll_s_t__Il_E:_(~rl.O:E:_~_t_()__C:.Qn_t_r~ 
~Q!J.._Qns: _ijll_E:_S t i'2-rl._<?_f_J'_()_:J: i ()_Y_P_!:: i()_r:_:i:_ t_ i E:_~, 1 6 An ti trust Bulle• 
455 at 460 (1971). 
upon by defendants is completely inaoposite to this act::· 
Ti'Jat case involved the question of whether the antitrust Lrns. 
the State of Texas, not those of the United States, would voi: 
contract. B3.sed on Texas statutes, the contract was held vo 
But in 1961, the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas faced the s;· 
question involved in the instant case in :S_E:_~~i()_t:i_~_~()_CTJ_Q~QL"'.'.: 
The Texas court, notw:: 
to permit an alleged violation of federal antitrust laws to 
asserted as 3. defense in an action for debt for merchant 
which had been delivered. 344 S.W.2d at 184. 
The various law review articles cited by defendants;: 
are in accord with the overwhelming weight of the case la•. 
the effect that the federal antitrust laws m3.y not be asser: 
as a defense to an action for the agreed price of goods sold' 
delivered. " .•. [W]henever a plaintiff sued to recover the pr: 
of property rights sold and deliverej, the defend3nt woulj' 
be permitted to raise alleged antitrust violations in defens' 
Sob el, .&_r:i_t_it_!::ll_S t _Q_E:_f E:_r:i_~es _to _c;_()_r:i_ t_ r:~_sot__l_()_ t_i ()_f2~: ~_9-_ll_E:_~t_iQ~- lS 
f~:I:iQY_J'_r::_i()_~itie~, 16 Antitrust Bulletin, 455 at 467 (1971). 
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Defendants also cite Section 50-1-6. Ut3h Code Anno-
::ited, pert3inin2: to unl3wful combinations to control prices. 
:1iS section was never raised as a defense by the defendants in 
this action nor has Grating, Inc. sued Keene under this section 
h the federal antitrust 3Ction. Defendants' reference to this 
section is, therefore, completely irrelevant. 
ih reason whatsoevcT exists to intermingle this action 
far the ag;reed price of goods sold and delivered with 3 pending 
fejeral an ti trust action. This action has run its course and 
- che federal antitrust action will do the same. Since anti trust 
defenses 1nay never be asserted in an action for the agreed price 
1
'· of goods solj and delivered, there is no way that the facts in 
:1is case can be twisted to support a claim that a judgment in 
l: :avar of Keene would make the State Court a party to enforcin~ 
the 'precise conduct" made illegal by Section 
a: l.c:. 
of the Sherman 
r: POI'JT II. 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FiirnINGS AND CONCLUSIONS THAT 
EQUITY WOULD NOT PREVENT THE ENFORCE'1ENT OF A CON-
TRACT FOR THE ~GREED PRICE OF GOODS SOLD AN8 
DELIVERED BECAUSE OF THE FRIE~DS!-!IP OF THE PARTIES 
IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE LAW AND THE FACTS. 
Grating, Inc. by purchase orders it prepared specifying 
acantity and price, ordered goods from Keene in the amount of 
~-
$66,674_ 16. Keene delivered an invoice in that amount. 
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(Exhibits 2P through 9P.) Defendants ad'llitted this very cor. 
tract for the agreed price of goods sold and delivere':l. Defe:· 
dants' only remaining defense not waived by them or stricken;: 
a matter of law was that Keene and Grating, Inc. orally modifi;· 
these invoices and purchase orders by agreeinis that Keene wou:: 
charge Grating, Inc. no more than other manufacturers chaqe 
for the same goods. 
After hearing conflicting testimony, the District Cw: 
found that Keene and Grating, Inc. did not agree orally th;: 
Grating, Inc. would be charged no more than other 'llariufacturer' 
but only that a mutual friendshio existed oursuant to whi~' 
Grating, Inc. sought and received assurances that it woul:J '.' 
kept "competitive". (~indings of Fact Nos. 15 and 19, R. o:. 
226-227; Trial Transcript R. pp. 274, 275 and 279. testi'.Tlony 1' 
Ralph W. Taylor; pp. 331, 332, 333, testi'Tiony of Brent Cox; P'· 
376, 399 and 400, testimony of Jerry McGee; oo. 405. 406. 401. 
410 and 411, testicnony of Theron John.) 
Defendants, after quoting out of context an abbreviats· 
part of the District Court's Memorandum Decision (and ignorir.: 
the District Court's Findings and Conclusions), ar<Sue for tC.e 
first time on appeal on pages 19-20 of their brief that Keene': 
supposed failure to live uo to its friendship with Gratinrs, r~c. 
resulted in a violation by Keene of Section 70A-1-203, U.c.P .. 
( 1953)' the section of the Utah Unifor'll Commercial C00 ' 
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]andating 'good foiith" in the perfor'!lance of contracts, and 
section 70A-1-201(H) U.C.A. (1953) defining "good faith" as 
"~onesty in f3.ct in the conduct or trans3.ction concerned." 
In m3.kin~ this argu'!lent. defendants ignore the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and funda'llentoil appellate principles. 
First, de fend ants irnper'llissibly rely on the lower 
court's Memorandum of Decision, rather than its Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law. Unlike Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of 
':iv:l Procedure permitting the Court to enter a Memorandum of 
Decisio1 in lieu of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
~1"e 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits ·no other 
procedure than !"indings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. De-
fendants entirely fail to refer to the trial court's Findings 
01j Conclusions in this proceeding. Such Findings and Con-
clusions were entered by the District Court and reaffirmed by it 
ifter defendants' lengthy and detailed Motion to Alter or Amend 
~he~. 
Second, by reference to the lower court's Findings of 
'act (awl, indeed, its Memorandum of Decision), it is evident 
that the District Court found against defendants on disputed 
t'l1dence by ruling that no oral agreement such as claimed by 
Jefendants existed modifying the written purchase orders and 
invoices. The District Court, in its Memorandum of Decision 
llso so ruled. (112, 117. 118. R. 189-192) The Findings and 
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Conclusions make the same determination. (,118, ,119 R. 226-2( 
Obviously, if the lower court so decided, even if there exis:o 
some contradictory evidence, this Court would not interfe: 
unless the F'indings were against the clear weii:;ht of the e ... 
dence. 
(1972). 
Do~_~'..__Q.Q.~, 43 Utah 200, 158 P. 781 (1916); 
Utah 2d 368, 503 
Elton 
P.21 
It is evident from the citations to the record herE:· 
set forth that the Court's findings as to the non-existence 
any oral modification of the purchase orders and invoices;· 
amply supported. 
Third, Section 70/l.-1-203, U. C. ~- ( 1953) was not :i.sser:' 
by defendants as a defense or adverted to in any way in the: 
Answer. (R. 21-24.) The first time defendants have cited tL 
statute is in this appeal. It is too late for defen:lants · 
raise this defense at this date. Rule 12(h), Utah Rules 
Civil Procedure, unambiguously provides that except in cert0: 
instances not here material, "[a] party waives all defenses ... : 
which he does not present ... in his answer .... " 
F'ourth, although finding that no oral agree'!lent exi;t' 
modifying the written purchase orders, the lower court also ma: 
alternative findings fully supported by the evidence th:i.t Kee' 
did, in fact, keep Grating, Inc. fully competitive. (Find in; 
of Fact Nos. 26, 28, and 29, R. at 228-229; see Statement c 
Facts herein, pp. 9-14). For example, Grating, Inc. was able: 
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resell the grating it purchased fro'.11 Keene which is the subject 
of this action at a substantial profit. Grating, Inc. had a 
very profitable year. Keene kept Grating, Inc. fully supplied 
with product during a period of shortage when, if product could 
be obtained at any price, it could be resold at a premium 
profit. Keene provided Grating, Inc. price protection when 
prices of steel to Keene were increased. Keene's own sales man-
ager helped Grating, Inc. market its product. Keene frequently 
gave Grating, Inc. discounts off its list price for large jobs. 
Defendants do not even discuss these alternative findings of the 
... District Court that although no oral agreement existed, Grating, 
Inc. was fully competitive in price as well as in other areas of 
i:: .]arketing. 
Fifth. defendants completely fail to advert to the Dis-
trict Court's Findings (Nos. 23, 24, and 25, R. at 227-228) 
i:· fully suoported by the evidence (see citations to the record in 
the State'.Tlent of Facts above pp. 9-11) that with respect to the 
particular price lists put in evidence by defendants supposedly 
t' t) establish that other manufacturers charged less than Keene, 
a: ~ARSCO' s price list was not effective in the area w'iere Grating, 
e: Inc. did business and actual sales by HARSCO in Grating, Inc.'s 
nr market 'lrea were at a price only a few cents below Keene's. As 
c t: the price list of Dravo, little, if any product was available 
hr sale from it. Therefore, even assuming an oral modification 
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existed to the subject written purchase orders arid invoices th:· 
Keene would charge no more than other manufacturers, defendant' 
themselves proved throus;h their own witnesses (Mt". Streeter f:: 
HARSCO and Mr. Johnson for Dravo) that Keene, in fact, chaq:: 
approximately the same prices as HARSCO and that Dravo \;· 
little, if any, grating for sale. 
Sixth, defendants fail to discuss their own comple:0 
lack of c;ood fait'i and unclean hands as found by the Co1;r· 
below. As discussed under Poirit I above, Grating, Inc. oder:: 
goods from Keene with no intention of paying for them and so:: 
Keene for millions of dollars for antitrust violations t!'le d: 
after receivins; the last of the grating ordered. This was dcr,' 
for the apparent purpose of financing an anti trust action wit· 
Keene's money. Grating, Inc. still refused to pay all or an: 
part of the debt it agreed was owing even after reselling th' 
grating at a handsome profit. As the Court below conclude]. 
equity will not relieve such a party from its written ourcr11s1 
orders and invoices for the agreed price of goods sold ar.: 
delivered. (Conclusion of Law No. 14, R. 232.) 
Seventh, defendants also fail to discuss the Distri:: 
Court's alternative Conclusions of Law that the 
cation of the written purchase orders and invoices 
oral rnodifi· 
(Exhibits 1 
through 9P) argued for by defendants could not be asserted as' 
defense because ( 1) under the Uniform Commercial Code. 
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70A-2-607-(1), Gratinis, Inc. and therefore defendants had to pay 
tl;"O full co;·itract price because the goods had been accepted 
unconditionally (Conclusi::>n of Law No. 10, R. p. 232.); (2) 
3ratiri>;, Inc. and therefore defendants were barred from any 
re::ieJf for failure to notify Keene of any alleged breach of the 
alle~ed oral agreement under Section 70A-2-607 ( 3). U. C. A. 
(1953); (3) the parol evidence rule of the Utah Uniform Com-
r,ercial Code, §70~-2-202 lJ.C.A. (1953) prevented anv such oral 
Mdification of a written contract; and (4) th2 statute of 
frauds of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code Section 70A-2-201 and 
Section 70A-2-209, U.C.A. (1953) prohibited any such oral con-
tract. (Conclusions of Law 10, 11, 12 and 13, R. p. 232.) Each 
of these conclusions is clearly correct and results in the same 
Ju:Jg.'flen t in tni s case. 
t hot 
25' 
: ~1 e 
the 
26, 
PCJINT III 
THE PI 1rnINGS OF FACT 2:NTERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
WERE FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AT THE TRIAL. 
On pages 22 and 23 of their brief, defendants assert 
Findings of Fae t by the Court Nos. 18, 1 9. 20, 23, 24, 
28' 29 and 30' ( R. pp. 226-230.) are not suoported by 
evidence. No citations to the record are made to support 
'Jch an argument. Rule 75 ( p) (2) (2) (d), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requires that a brief contain a statement of facts 
'~i tin_g__~J:i_§. __ l?_~g_§.~ __ Q L_~he _i::_~~2i::_q_ su Pl?_Ql'.:_!_ir:i_g___~\!~Q-~ ~§_~em§.!!!:." 
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(Emphasis A.dded. J Failure to do so results in the appeal bfr.· 
treated as bein'S from the judgment roll alone. In re Lavelle' 
- --- -~- -----..:: 
~~1'_§_1::_~, 122 Utah 253, 248 P. 2d 3 72 ( 1952) (quoting fro~ ,. 
earlier decision). 
Keene sugcsests that perhaps defendants ourposefully hav• 
omitted citing t11e record in oder to do so in a 'leoly Erie' 
thus preventing Keene from responding. This t3.ctic, of course. 
would viol3.te Rule 75(o)(2) li'Tliting Reply Briefs to 'new mat:e· 
set forth in respondent's brief.,. To o8vi3.te this possHilit. 
and for the assistance of this Court, Keene has provided a su:· 
r:iary of each of the District Court's Findings under its State· 
ment of Facts herein, together with cit3.tions to the record, 
including Tri3.l Transcript and Exhibits. These establish th': 
each finding ch3.llenged by defendants is fully supported by t'1' 
record. 
POP.JT IV 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S REFUSA.L TO EXERCISE ITS 
EQUITABLE POWER TO STAY THIS ACTIO"l PEirnING THE 
OUTC0'.1E OF THE FEDERA.L A.NTITRUST ACTION '.HS NOT AtJ 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
As previously indicated herein (pages 2 and 3, Disposi· 
tion in the Lower Court), the District Court, 3.fter a hearinq, 
denied defendants' motion to stay this action and, in particu· 
lar, struck the defendants' antitrust defenses. It is axiomatic 
that a court may, in the exercise of its equit3.ble power. stF 
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oroceedings in its souncJ discretion. On page 24 of their brief, 
cefendants assert without any discussion whatsoever that this 
Court shoul1 instruct the District Court to "stay all proceed-
ings, including a!'ly proceedings to collect the Partial Summary 
Jud~'llent for $40.000.00, until the completion of the federal 
antitrust 
aut~ori ty 
Court . 
action." Defendants make no argument and cite no 
instruct the District as to why this Court should so 
An examination of the record herein clearly reveals that 
the District Court in no way abused its discretion in refusing 
to exercise its equitable power 
pletion of a lengthy antitrust 
equity, one must do equity. 
to stay this 
action. In 
action until com-
order to receive 
As we have seen, Grating, Inc. 
ordered and received goods from Keene Corporation with no 
intention of paying for them, resold those goods at a substan-
tial profit, and refused to pay all or any part of the agreed 
price. It is obvious that the monies received by Grating, Inc. 
after selling Keene's goods were an::l are being used to finance 
the prosecution of a federal antitrust action against Keene. 
Th2 District Court below refused to be a party to such conduct 
and refused to per'llit defendants to avoid paying for goods sold 
and delivered. Such a ruling cannot constitute an abuse of 
discretion. 
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No stay of this action is necessary because Grating, 
Inc. and defendants will receive w'iatever remedy they are en-
titled to from the antitrust claims arsainst Keene in the pendin'. 
federal action. If Grating, Inc. looses that action and thi' 
Court were to grant a stay, then Grating, Inc. would have bw 
successful in financing a nonmeri torious action with Keens': 
money. If Grating, Inc. is successful, it will receive trebl; 
damages as the express and exclusive statutory remedv for vio· 
lation of the fe-:leral anti trust laws. Such remedy certain'.· 
woul:l be sufficient, and therefore no stay of this actio~ i' 
indicated. 
CONCLlJSIOl\J 
Since antitrust defenses based upon violations of t':c 
Sherman Act have been rejected overwhelmingly by the courts, i~· 
eluding the IJ. S. Supreme Court, the District Court below wa: 
correct in striking defen-:lants' antitrust defenses in thi: 
action and leaving the'll to their re11edy in the federal cou~: 
antitrust action. 
The lower court's Findings and Conclusions rejecting a,. 
oral modification of the written purchase orders and invoices l' 
claimed by defendants were fully supported by the evidence a,: 
the law, not only in the particulars challen;;ed by defendant' 
but also for the several other reasons recited by the Distric: 
Court. 
-40-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, th3.t the judg-
~ent and ruling of the District Court below should be affirmed. 
_- L/1 
DATED this _z-:_~day of September, 1978. 
V~N COTT, BAGLSY, CORN~ALL & 
McC.l\RTI-!Y 
B / -,/ ,, ·. , ~~~< ;;'7--
y --~-t--.. h7-/.+-,r,-,,-.~/~~L:AL;£-?,,.. 
Dennis Mcuarthy ~
By ~JJ._2-fbl__,n-4__ ________ _ 
Davi~~~~~wood 
CERTIFICATE OF M~ILI~G 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoinq; Brief 
of Pl:J.intiff-Respondent Keene Corporation was mailed this 8th 
day of September, 1978, postage prepaid. to: 
R. Brent Stephens 
Richard K. Crandall of 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellants 
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